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Summary 
In a recent edition of Perspectives on Politics, Larry Bartels examines the high 
levels of support for tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001. In so doing, he 
characterizes the opinions of “ordinary people” as lacking “a moral basis” and as being 
based on “simple-minded and sometimes misguided considerations of self interest.”  He 
concludes that “the strong plurality support for Bush’s tax cut...is entirely attributable to 
simple ignorance.”   
 
Our analysis of the same data reveals different results. We show that for a large 
and politically relevant class of respondents – people who describe themselves as 
“conservative” or “Republican” – rising information levels increase support for the tax 
cuts. Indeed, using Bartels’ measure of political information, we show that the 
Republican respondents rated “most informed” supported the tax cuts at extraordinarily 
high levels (over 96%). For these citizens, Bartels’ claim that “better-informed 
respondents were much more likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” is 
simply untrue.  
 
We then show that Bartels’ results depend on a very strong assumption about how 
information affects public opinion. He restricts all respondents -- whether liberal or 
conservative, Republican or Democrat – to respond to increasing information levels in 
identical ways.  In other words, he assumes that if more information about the tax cut 
makes liberals less likely to support it, then conservatives must follow suit. This 
assumption is very presumptive about the policy trade-offs that different people should 
make. Our analysis, by contrast, allows people of different partisan or ideological 
identities to react to higher information levels in varying ways. This flexibility has many 
benefits, one of which is a direct test of Bartels’ restrictive assumption. We demonstrate 
that the assumption is untrue. Examined several ways, our findings suggest that much of 
the support for the tax cut was attributable to something other than “simple ignorance.”  
 
Bartels’ approach is based on a very strong presumption about how citizens 
should think and what they should think about. We advocate a different approach, one 
that takes questions of public policy seriously while respecting ideological and partisan 
differences in opinion and interest. Indeed, citizens have reasons for the opinions and 
interests they have. We may or may not agree with them. However, we, as social 
scientists, can contribute more by offering reliable explanations of these reasons than we 
can by judging them prematurely. By turning our attention to explaining differences of 
opinion, we can help to forge a stronger and more credible foundation for progress in 
meeting critical social needs.
 1
 
A recent edition of Perspectives on Politics includes two articles that focus on the 
federal tax cuts of 2001 (Bartels 2005, Hacker and Pierson 2005). Such attention is 
merited given the controversy surrounding the policy. Conservative and liberal opinion 
leaders disagreed about the motivation for -- and long-term consequences of -- the tax 
cut. Some claimed that the cut was nothing more than a scheme to coddle the rich while 
others saw it as a means for promoting economic growth.  
In “Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind,” 
Larry Bartels (2005: 20) uses the 2002 American National Election Studies (NES) to 
examine public support for this policy. He finds that two-thirds of respondents who 
offered an opinion about the tax cut approved of it. Bartels then seeks to explain this high 
level of public support. He argues that if Americans had been more enlightened, greater 
numbers would have opposed the cuts.  
Bartels’ conclusion about the “the public mind” is not charitable. The “Homer” to 
whom citizens are compared in “Homer Gets a Tax Cut” is Homer Simpson, the cartoon 
überdolt who Wikipedia describes as simple-minded. Bartels, in turn, characterizes the 
opinions of “ordinary people” as being superficial and based on “simple-minded and 
sometimes misguided considerations of self interest” (Bartels 2005: 21). In particular, he 
claims that  
“Finally, and most importantly, better-informed respondents were much more 
likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut….If we take this 
crosssectional difference in views as indicative of the effect of information on 
political preferences, it appears that the strong plurality support for Bush’s tax cut 
… is entirely attributable to simple ignorance (Bartels 2005:24).  
 
In what follows, we report results from an analysis of the same data. Our findings 
and conclusions are quite different than those attributed to voters in “Homer.” Like 
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Bartels, we agree that it is important to understand why voters support or oppose 
particular policies and the role that information plays in such assessments. We also 
recognize that isolating the role of information in citizens’ opinions is no simple task. For 
if an analyst wishes to claim that a particular opinion is “entirely attributable to simple 
ignorance,” he or she must be able to compare observed opinions to what people would 
have opined if they were not “simply ignorant.” Bartels measures the “effect of political 
information by comparing the views of better and worse informed respondents in the 
NES survey using a measure of political information based on interviewers’ ratings of 
respondents” (Bartels 2005: 23). In other words, he draws his conclusion by comparing 
the opinions of citizens who NES interviewers rated highly in terms of political 
information with citizens rated not as high.2 By contrast, we show that for a large and 
politically relevant group of respondents – people who describe themselves as 
“conservative” or “Republican” -- higher information ratings either have no significant 
effect on support for the tax cut or they correspond to increased support for the cuts, even 
after accounting for income differences. For respondents who do not label themselves as 
“liberal” or “Democratic,” the claim that “better-informed respondents were much more 
likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” is simply untrue.   
In addition to presenting our result, we explain why Bartels achieved different 
results than we did. The explanation is not complicated. Bartels makes a very strong 
assumption about how information affects public opinion. He restricts all respondents -- 
whether liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat – to respond to increasing 
information levels in an identical way. Must changes in information levels have such 
 3
universal effects? Or is it possible that on issues such as the merit of a tax cut proposal, 
reasonable people can disagree?   
To see why Bartels’ assumption is problematic, suppose for a moment that we 
gave respondents more information about the tax cuts. Suppose, moreover, that this 
additional information revealed that the tax cuts would spur long-term economic growth 
at the expense of greater economic inequality in the short-run. Bartels’ analysis requires 
liberals and conservatives (and Republicans and Democrats) to react to this information 
in the same way. Even if the truth or relevance of additional information is contested 
(e.g., if leading economists disagree about how a tax cut affects economic growth), or if 
the matters on which experts agree involve a tradeoff between competing social goals, 
Bartels proceeds as though all respondents must respond identically to the added 
information. In this respect, he writes as if there is only one right answer – only one 
conclusion about the Bush tax cuts that a highly-informed respondent can reach. But 
often in politics, and perhaps distinctively in politics, there is a clash of perspectives, 
values, and views about how society works.3  
Our analysis differs from that in “Homer” in that we allow people of different 
partisan or ideological identities to react to higher information levels in different ways. In 
so doing, we can test Bartels’ assumption. While our study could have verified that 
higher information ratings affect the tax cut opinions of all political ideologues or 
partisans in the same way, it did not. The assumption is simply untrue. Increasing 
information ratings affect liberals and conservatives (and Republicans and Democrats) 
very differently. While seemingly a technical point, this difference in assumptions is 
sufficient to make Bartels’ conclusion erroneous.  
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The paper continues as follows. In the section entitled “A New Finding,” we 
present our initial result. In “Can Reasonable People Disagree,” we compare our analysis 
to that of “Homer Gets a Tax Cut” and show how the restrictive information assumption 
affects the results. In “How Other People Should Think,” we assess Bartels’ claim that 
people who reported not having thought about economic inequality in a particular way 
“lacked a moral basis” for their opinions. In “A Constructive Way Forward,” we propose 
a different approach that takes public policy questions seriously while respecting 
ideological differences in opinion. 
A New Finding 
It is important to understand why voters support and oppose the policies as they 
do and to discover what role information plays in their assessments. However, 
conclusions about how information affects opinion can be difficult to draw because we 
usually only observe citizens with the information they have. Nature seldom provides us 
with direct observations of how people might think or act if given more (or less) 
information. So to claim that ignorance is the cause of a particular outcome, one must be 
able to compare an observed behavior to what someone would have done if they had 
more information. While there are many ways to do this, we will keep things simple by 
following Bartels’ procedures and assumptions -- with one notable exception. 
Bartels shows that among respondents who offered an opinion on the tax cut, an 
overwhelming majority supported it. He argues that much of this support was due to 
ignorance. His claim is based on a relationship he observes between support for the tax 
cut and the NES information rating taken at the end of the interview. The survey 
interviewer is asked to rate the interviewer’s political information. They can choose one 
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of five responses: very high, fairly high, average, fairly low, and very low.4 Figures 1 and 
2 show how these information ratings correspond to support for the tax cut.5  
[Figures 1 and 2 about here.] 
Figure 1 shows this correspondence for the sample as a whole. It shows that as 
people reach higher information levels, they are less likely to support the tax cut. 
However, the effect of information is quite small for the sample considered as a whole, 
which cuts against the claim that “better-informed respondents were much more likely to 
express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” (Bartels 2005:24). 
Figure 2, while depicting a more substantial relationship between information and 
opinion, exposes an important qualification to Bartels’ claim. The bars on the right-hand 
side of Figure 2 depict this relationship for respondents who label themselves 
“conservative” when asked about their ideology (top) and/or “Republican” when asked 
abut their partisanship (bottom). We display both groups to demonstrate that our result 
survives using either categorization and because Bartels alternates between these 
categories in “Homer." For this large group of citizens, the relationship between 
information rating and tax cut opinion is just the opposite of what Bartels describes. As 
members of these groups achieve higher information scores, their support for the tax cut 
increases. Also noteworthy are the extremely high levels at which all members of these 
groups support the tax cut. For conservatives, 82% of respondents whose information 
rating was “average” or below supported the tax cut. This compares to 88% of those who 
rated “very high.” For Republicans, the corresponding statistics are 89% for respondents 
rated “average” or below and 96% for those rated “very high.” Among these groups, 
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there was a clear consensus in favor of the tax cut – particularly for those who were 
coded as having the most information.  
The left-hand side of Figure 2 depicts the relationship for self-identified liberals 
and Democrats.6 For these groups, support for the tax cut decreases as the information 
rating increases. That said, roughly half of these respondents supported the tax cut when 
their information rating was “average” or below and over a third continued to support the 
policy when rated “very high.” Even amongst the most highly rated liberals and 
Democrats, there existed diverse opinions about the tax cut.7 
Bartels claims that ignorance explains the overwhelming support for the tax cuts. 
Figure 2 suggests a different story. For liberals, higher information ratings correspond to 
more tax cut opposition. For conservatives, the same is not true.8  
Can Reasonable People Disagree? 
In this section, we replicate the core finding in the statistical analysis of “Homer 
Gets a Tax Cut” and show that its ignorance claim is due to an assumption about 
information that is questionable as a general matter and, in this case, is falsified by the 
data. While “Homer” includes a range of statistical analyses, its main conclusion derives 
from the final regression equation included in its Table 4 and reprinted without changes 
here as the first column of Table 1.  
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
The purpose of Bartels’ analysis is to estimate how different information levels 
affect a respondent’s likelihood of supporting the tax cut. Its dependent variable comes 
from the question, 
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“As you may recall, Congress passed [President Bush signed] a big tax cut last 
year. Did you favor or oppose the tax cut, or is this something you haven’t 
thought about? Do you favor [oppose] the tax cut strongly or not strongly? 
 
The main explanatory variable is the interviewer rating of the respondent’s political 
information described above. Control variables in the analysis account for party 
identification, family income, and a question wording experiment in which half of the 
respondents were told that “President Bush signed” the tax cut while the other half was 
told that “Congress passed” it. With the exception of party identification, none of the 
control variables produce large or statistically significant effects.  
In the second column of Table 1 we report our replication of Bartels’ analysis.9 
While not exact, it retains Bartels’ large, negative, and statistically significant coefficient 
of “political information.” This coefficient is -.907 in his original result and -.721 in our 
replication. This estimate is the basis of the claim that “better-informed respondents were 
much more likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” and the conclusion, 
“the strong plurality support for Bush’s tax cut...is entirely attributable to simple 
ignorance.”  
As previewed in the introduction, however, Bartels’ regression – both its original 
version and its replicate -- restricts all respondent opinions about the tax cut to react to 
changing information ratings in an identical manner. Applying this same logic more 
generally, we would have to assume that Bush supporters and Kerry supporters would 
react to any new information carried in 2004’s “Swift Boat” commercials in identical 
ways or that every American would respond identically to questions about the suitability 
of a nominee for the Supreme Court after learning that she or he was pro-choice. In many 
political settings, such an assumption makes no sense as politics often involve trade-offs 
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between outcomes valued by one group and outcomes consistent with other values. In 
this case, we will show that Bartels’ assumption is falsified by the data. 
We present our analyses in the third through sixth columns of Table 1. In contrast 
to Bartels’ regression, we do not make any a priori assumption about how different 
partisan and ideological groups should react to different amounts of information. By 
running separate regressions for liberals and conservatives, and separate regressions for 
Democrats and Republicans, we let the data tell us whether more information affects 
members of the group in the same or different ways.10  
Our regressions show differences in how information ratings relate to tax cut 
support. Were Bartels’ assumption about information and public opinion correct, we 
would see very similar coefficients on the political information variable (i.e., his 
assumption would receive greatest support if all of the numbers in bold font were close to 
-.907 or -.721.) Table 1 shows that this does not happen. 
In columns 3 through 6, increasing information ratings makes liberals and 
Democrats less likely to support the tax cut. However, higher information ratings have no 
significant effect on conservative or Republican support for the tax cut. Put another way, 
reasonable people (e.g., highly informed liberals and highly informed conservatives) can 
disagree – and in this case they did. Only liberals react as Bartels predicts. Other 
respondents react quite differently. 
Fueling Bartels’ result was what some scholars call “within group variance” and 
what others might call “ceiling effects.” Put simply, in the present context, liberals vary 
in ways that other respondents do not. Conservatives or Republicans – it doesn’t matter 
which categorization is used – supported the tax cut at extraordinarily high levels, 
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regardless of their information ratings. Referring back to Figure 2 reveals not only the 
conservative consensus, but also considerable differences among liberals. Bartels’ 
analysis merges these effects into a single statistic. Our analysis reveals that the size and 
statistical significance of his “-.907” coefficient is driven largely by the large variance in 
the relationship between information and opinion among Democrats/liberals. Merging the 
effects masks the conservative consensus. Had conservatives/Republicans not been in 
such high agreement about the tax cuts, the “ignorance” conclusion would have been 
harder to refute. But “the right” was in agreement on this issue.  
If we take our result as indicative of the effect of information on political 
preferences, we can easily reject the hypothesis “the strong plurality support for Bush’s 
tax cut...is entirely attributable to simple ignorance.” For this conclusion to be true, the 
effect of political information on tax cut support would have to be large, negative, and 
statistically significant for all respondents. Table 1 shows that it is not. Instead, support 
for the tax cuts comes from a conservative consensus (which varies little with 
information rating or income) and quite a few liberals, including some who earned high 
information ratings.11 Examined several ways, it appears that much of the support for the 
tax cut is attributable to something other than ignorance. 
How Other People Should Think 
Elsewhere in “Homer,” citizens are described as “simple-minded,” 
“unenlightened,” “superficial,” and “lacking a factual or moral basis” because of the 
opinions they held. A point of emphasis for Bartels in drawing such conclusions is the 
fact that many NES respondents, when interviewed late in 2002, reported not having 
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thought about a tax cut that was passed early in 2001.  What conclusions can we draw 
about such citizens? 
Since several events of great public relevance have occurred since the passage of 
the 2001 tax cut, it may be difficult to remember that it was supported not just by 
citizens, but also by many political elites. Among economists, the set of endorsements 
ranged from Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan and William Niskanen to Princeton 
Economist Alan Blinder, who served under President Clinton as the Vice Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors and as a member of the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisors. Blinder, in fact, argued that the tax cut in the first year was too 
small.12 Indeed, the tax cut bill, HR 1836, won by clear majorities in the House and 
Senate. In the House, all voting Republicans voted yes along with five Democrats. In the 
Senate, all voting Republicans voted yes as did 7 Democrats (Baucus, Feinstein, Johnson, 
Kohl, Landrieu, Lincoln, Nelson). Independent Jim Jeffords, who earlier in the year left 
the Republican Party to give the Democrats control of the Senate, also voted yes. This 
evidence reinforces our conclusion about support for the tax cut coming from places 
other than ignorance. As with citizens, there was a consensus in favor of the cuts on the 
right and variance on the left. Reasonable people disagreed. 
It is also important to remember that expert and public discussions of the tax 
policy focused on more than economic inequality. The cuts were proposed as the 
economy continued to slow, as the collapse of the tech stock bubble and the dot-com 
era’s “irrational exuberance” were being fully realized, and soon after the federal surplus 
came in far larger than most analysts expected. In 2001, the tax cut debate was about 
much more than inequality. 
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Of course, politics is filled with people who make claims about what others 
should know. They will assert that certain pieces of information should take precedence 
in decision-making. For example, pro-life advocates will encourage people to focus on 
the plight of the unborn child, while pro-choice advocates will encourage audiences to 
focus on the plight of pregnant women. In other cases, advocates claim that certain issues 
should be raised above all others in the public mind – claims about which attributes of 
life and society others should weigh most heavily when contemplating social issues.  
Bartels’ descriptions of citizens as “simple-minded,” “unenlightened,” 
“superficial,” and “lacking a factual or moral basis” for not thinking about a particular 
policy (the 2001 tax cut) in a particular way are based on strong assumptions about the 
kinds of tradeoffs that people with different values should make. The “superficial” 
description, for example, is in reference to individuals who reported not having thought 
about whether the 2001 tax cut was good or bad. But what aspects of politics should 
citizens think about? The answer is less clear-cut than “Homer” suggests.  
While inequality is an important aspect of social life, it is not the only one. To 
make this point concretely, we went back to the 2002 NES pre-election study from which 
the tax cut question was drawn. We found three other questions that had a format similar 
to that question – similar in that the question allowed respondents to offer a response 
about a particular political issue or allowed them to say that they hadn’t thought about it 
(or were not at all interested). The questions meeting this criterion covered a possible war 
with Iraq, corporate scandals (such as Enron), and interest in the 2002 campaign.13 We 
approached these survey items with a simple question in mind – how many respondents 
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who reported not thinking about the tax cuts reported thinking about one or more of these 
other issues? Table 2 reveals the results. 
[Table 2 about here.] 
Only 3 out of every 200 respondents report not thinking about any of the four 
issues. In other words, using Bartels’ measure of whether or not citizens thought about 
the tax cut issue, over 98% reported having thought about one or more of the four issues. 
This means that almost all of the NES respondents who were characterized as simple 
minded for not thinking about the tax cut reported thinking about other political issues. 
Clearly, respondents varied in the political topics that interested them. Given that the 
2002 NES was conducted so soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, six months before the 
widely anticipated war with Iraq, and over a year after the 2001 tax cuts had been passed, 
Table 2’s distribution of attention should not be surprising.  
Though these four questions cover only a small fraction of the issues that make 
people interested in politics, they are sufficient to reinforce the long-standing finding 
(see, e.g., Iyengar 1986, 1991) that citizens vary in the political topics that engage them. 
The fact that many do not pay attention to an issue such as tax cuts may say little about 
their political competence more generally. Who are we to say that someone who thinks 
about matters of life and death such as war or terrorism, or someone who thinks more 
about unemployment or morality or education or crime or abortion than they do about 
economic inequality or the tax cut, are “simple minded?”  
A similar argument holds for citizens who care about inequality but had not 
thought about the specific tax proposals described on the 2002 NES. The fate of the poor 
depends on many factors, some of which are a direct function of federal tax policy and 
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others that are not. With this fact in mind, it is important to realize that most citizens lack 
the opportunity to act on individual policy proposals. The connection Bartels seeks 
regarding the 2001 tax cut is not one on which most citizens could act efficaciously.   
Citizens do not get to vote from among a long list of possible tax policies. At the 
federal level, citizens’ choices are very limited: they can choose a president, a House 
member, and a Senator who, to varying degrees, can affect tax cut debates. Given 
Bartels’ evidence, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that many people eschewed 
investing in information upon which they can never act (i.e., federal tax policy) in favor 
of information on which they can. The same people who paid little attention to Bush’s tax 
policy may have concluded that other issues were more important or that information 
about state, local, or neighborhood level civic activities (including, perhaps, local 
activities that help the poor) were a better investment of their time. That they respond to a 
survey question about the tax cut by saying that they haven’t thought about it may just 
tell us that they have made a different set of trade-offs; that other social issues or venues 
are more relevant to them.14 
 Indeed, all available survey evidence suggests that many people who voted for 
George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 continue to support his domestic agenda. This group 
includes many very intelligent people who are very knowledgeable about the actions of 
government, people who knowingly did not benefit from the tax cut, and people who 
have found his choices to be consistent with their notions of the public good. Of course, 
some in this group will base their support for Bush on very diffuse stereotypes of the 
consequences, but this fact will not distinguish them from many people who support 
Democratic candidates. Voters choose from the candidates they are offered with varying 
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levels of awareness about the impact of a candidate’s policy agendas. Some do so 
because, given how they weigh the large number of issues upon which a presidential vote 
can be cast, Bush is a far better fit than any Democrat. That Democrats reach a different 
conclusion is not sufficient evidence to render either group wrong. Difference need not 
imply ignorance.15 
Going beyond the issue of partisan differences, it is true that Bartels identifies a 
group of respondents who supported the tax cut at the same time that they said that 
economic inequality is a “bad thing.” Were they acting ignorantly? While the two 
opinions appear internally inconsistent, they are far from providing concrete evidence of 
ignorance. Indeed, we contend that the 2002 NES data is not well equipped to support the 
“simple ignorance” conclusion because it contains very little information about what 
people were thinking when they answered the questions at issue. While the study is a 
tremendous resource for demonstrating the strong patterns of public opinion that we offer 
above, it provides precious little data about the mental states of the people offering those 
opinions. To see the difference, suppose that you answer two questions. When asked if 
you would like to earn more, you say “yes.” When asked if you would like to see 
economic inequality reduced, you also say “yes.” Then, you are offered an opportunity to 
earn more. You take it. Your decision can increase economic inequality. Suppose that it 
does. In this situation, there are a range of conclusions we might draw about the 
relationship between your mental state and your actions. First, we might conclude that 
you are ignorant – that you do not understand that you just chose to earn more and, 
hence, increase inequality even though you said that you preferred less inequality. 
Second, we might conclude that you are not willing to sacrifice any pay increase, no 
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matter how immediate or large, in exchange for decrease in inequality, no matter how 
remote, uncertain, or small. Given our observation, however, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that there are other circumstances in which you would sacrifice higher pay for 
less inequality. A third possibility is that you were not as committed to the principle as 
you said you were (because, perhaps, saying to someone else that economic inequality is 
“bad” is more socially acceptable than saying the opposite). These three cases describe 
three different descriptions of your mental state.  Without more information, we cannot 
tell which description of you is correct. 
So considering what economists and other experts have said about the 2001 tax 
cuts, perhaps we can agree to characterize it as analogous to the package “tax rebate now 
plus greater short term economic inequality plus debatable longer term economic 
effects.” That citizens opted for this particular tax cut over the pre-2001 tax code may, as 
Bartels implies, tell us that they were too “unenlightened” to see any kind of connection 
between the policy and the principle OR it may tell us that they would have preferred 
other, more equal, tax proposals to the final Bush plan (had such proposals been offered)  
OR it may tell us that while they prefer less inequality, this desire is less important to 
them than supporting a policy that was likely to provide an immediate economic stimulus 
OR it may tell us that the respondents weren’t so committed to inequality in the first 
place. While Bartels (2005:25) concludes that “public support for President Bush’s tax 
policies derived in considerable part from “unenlightened” considerations of self-
interest,” the fact of the matter is that the data do not allow us to distinguish the 
possibilities listed above from one another.16 Given the 2002 NES data, these mental 
states are observationally equivalent.  
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To use a study such as “Homer” to reach the conclusion that voters are 
“unenlightened,” “simple-minded,” or “simply ignorant” requires a great deal of 
speculation – speculation for which direct evidence is scant. Instead of characterizing 
people as misguided, it may be more instructive to conduct scholarship that attempts to 
better fit our analyses into their rationales – including the likelihood that they approach 
political problems from varying ideological perspectives and with different values in 
mind.17 Such improved inferences are within the capabilities of contemporary social 
science, but they require a different kind of inquiry into the attributes of American minds.  
We suspect that many opponents of the tax cut were pleased to hear that public 
support for a policy with which they disagreed was due to the public’s ignorance. It is 
heartening to think that the rationale for an outcome we dislike is that the people with 
whom we disagree are just uninformed. In this case, like many parallel explanations of 
political outcomes offered on the right as well as the left, such stories may be comforting 
and even entertaining, but it is important to know when they are untrue.18  
A Constructive Way Forward 
 “Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind” 
offers a critique of the conclusions that many citizens reached about the 2001 tax cut. Our 
essay offers a critique of the conclusions in “Homer.” Critiques, when valid, can be 
informative. But a better understanding of the American mind and its implications for 
public policy requires more than critiques. We end by offering a constructive way 
forward. 
This alternative entails rethinking the relationship between the people who study 
social phenomena and the people who are being studied. Consider, for example, 
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Andreasen’s (1995:42-43) explanation of skewed interpretations of this relationship 
inhibit the field of social marketing:  
“Customers are the problem… Here, the customers [or in the case of “Homer,” 
citizens] are “seen as the source of the problem.” The customer is seen as 
deficient in one of two ways.  
 
Ignorance. Because the social marketer knows what a good idea it is to practice 
safe sex or put campfires out carefully, he or she assumes that the reason other 
people don’t do this is that they simply do not know how desirable the marketer’s 
favorite behavior is. Customers who are not complying are just too ignorant of the 
virtues of the proposed action. 
 
Lack of Motivation. Every once in a while, social marketers who are convinced 
that customer ignorance is the main source of their lack of success are confronted 
by research data showing that customers are not all as ignorant as the marketers 
thought. They then turn to their backup explanation: the real problem must be a 
character flaw.”  
 
In this view (p. 44), “customers are seen as ignorant, weak individuals.” The type of 
assessment permeates “Homer Gets a Tax Cut.” While it contends that people disagreed 
with its point of view because they were simply ignorant, it is hard to reject the 
hypothesis that many of them were deemed ignorant because they simply disagreed.20  
We have a different approach. It is consistent with Andreasen’s remedy (1995: 
49) for the problem described above: “[t]he customer is seen as someone with unique 
perceptions, needs, and wants to which the marketer must adapt.” Indeed, citizens have 
reasons for the opinions they have. We may or may not agree with them. However, we, as 
social scientists, should resist judging the rationales of others before we understand them.   
In this case, it is not clear how well these rationales were understood. In “Homer,” 
there was no concrete demonstration that people supported the tax cuts because they 
misunderstood critical facts. Indeed, no questions in which citizens could give true or 
false answers to questions about any concrete facts were analyzed. Instead, what was 
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demonstrated is that citizens’ responses to several questions about their opinions did not 
fit together in the way that one possible theory of what-should-go-with-what would have 
suggested. “Homer” blames citizens for the difference. We looked elsewhere and found 
an alternate explanation. 
Members of politically relevant groups often disagree. We can learn a great deal 
about modern politics by studying why they reach different conclusions.21 With such 
knowledge we can match critical social needs (such as those of the poor) with citizens’ 
desires. In so doing, a stronger and more credible foundation for progress in meeting 
these needs will be forged.
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Figure 1. Support for the Tax Cut by NES Post-Election Information Rating. The numbers in parentheses refers to the number of 
respondents fitting into the stated category. 
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Figure 2. Ideological Differences in Support for the Tax Cut by NES Post-Election Information Rating. The numbers in parentheses 
refers to the number of respondents fitting into the stated category. 
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Dependent Variable: Support for/Opposition to the Tax Cut 
 “Homer” Replication w/o imputation  Republicans Democrats Conservatives Liberals 
Political Information  
(0 to 1) 
-.907 
(.353) 
-.721 
(.329) 
.102 
(.461) 
-1.567 
(.492) 
.390 
(.360) 
-2.228 
(.850) 
Republican Party identification  
(-1 to 1) 
.759 
(.055) 
.769 
(.055) 
    
Family Income  
(in 1000s) 
.0002 
(.001) 
-.0004 
(.001) 
.000 
(.001) 
.002 
(.002) 
.001 
(.001) 
.002 
(.002) 
“President Bush” wording -.080 
(.049) 
-.089 
(.050) 
-.032 
(.051) 
-.072 
(.086) 
.011 
(.058) 
.000 
(.102) 
Constant .873 
(.153) 
.911 
(.211) 
.648 
(.316) 
1.013 
(.308) 
.237 
(.228) 
1.546 
(.563) 
Obs 896 858 
 
418 387 
 
522 310 
Table 1. A Replication and Expansion of Bartels’ Information-Opinion Analysis. Positive coefficients indicate increased support. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Thought about Haven't thought about % of Non-Thinkers 
One or more of the 4 Issues 1169 18 1.52 
    
Tax Cut 992 519 34.35 
Iraq 1012 175 14.74 
Corporate Scandals 1337 171 11.34 
The 2002 Campaigns 1178 326 21.68 
 
Table 2. What 2002 Pre-Election NES Respondents Haven’t Thought About 
 
Sample sizes differ for these questions because the Iraq question was asked only of panel respondents (respondents who had also participated in the 2000 NES) 
while the other questions were asked of both panel respondents and respondents who were being interviewed for the first time.  
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1 We thank Scott Althaus, John Bullock, Nancy E. Burns, James N. Druckman, Elisabeth 
R. Gerber, Orit Kedar, Kenneth W. Kollman, Arthur Lupia Sr., Jan Lupia, Diana C. 
Mutz, Samuel L. Popkin, Markus Prior, Paul M. Sniderman, and Kaare Strom for advice 
on the manuscript. We thank Larry Bartels for his generosity and assistance in our 
replication efforts. We thank David Howell and the NES Staff for assistance with the 
NES data set. This manuscript uses data from the 2002 American National Election 
Studies, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York (grant B7532), the Center 
for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, the Russell Sage 
Foundation (grant 83-02-05), and the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social 
Research, Office of the Provost, Office of the Vice President of Research, and Political 
Science for funding the 2002 National Election Studies; Nancy E. Burns and Donald R. 
Kinder – Principal Investigators.  
2 The 2002 NES was run on a smaller budget than those of the presidential election years. 
It was phone-based and much shorter than other NES surveys. As a result, many common 
NES questions were not asked in 2002, including well-known “political information” 
questions. Like Bartels, we use post-election interviewer ratings as an instrument for pre-
election interviewer ratings in our analysis to minimize the probability that the rating is 
contaminated by a respondent’s answers to the tax cut and inequality questions, which 
were asked in the pre-election survey.  
 
3 We thank Paul Sniderman for suggesting this wording to us.  
 
4 Since so few respondents were below average, we merged them into the “average” 
category in Figures 1 and 2. In the pre-election interview, fewer than 9% of the 
respondents were rated below average (either “fairly low” or “very low). Just over 10% 
of respondents earned this rating in the post-election interview. Liberals and 
conservatives were not significantly different in this respect with conservatives receiving 
slightly higher ratings on average.  
 
5 Zaller (1985, 1986) offers an explanation and defense of these interviewer ratings. His 
arguments are part of a continuing argument about the validity of survey-based political 
information measures (see, e.g., Althaus 2004, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993, 1996; 
Iyengar 1986, 1991; Lupia 2005, Mondak 1999, and Mondak and Davis 2001). We use 
these measures to show that a simple variation in Bartels’ analysis yields a very different 
substantive conclusion. To make the examination efficiently, we use Bartels’ analysis as 
a foundation and develop our own result with a small number of changes from his 
analysis. Except where noted, therefore, our choice of variables and codings are identical 
to those of Bartels.  
 
6 Of the 122 liberals placed into Figure 2’s average or below category, the tax cut was 
supported by 80% of the 5 rated “very low,” by 64% of the 14 rated “fairly low,” and by 
48% of the 103 rated “average.” Of the 211 conservatives placed into Figure 2’s average 
or below category, the tax cut was supported by 40% of the 5 rated “very low,” by 81% 
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of the 31 rated “fairly low,” and by 83% of the 175 rated “average.” Of the 168 
Democrats placed into Figure 2’s average or below category, the tax cut was supported 
by 57% of the 7 rated “very low,” by 61% of the 23 rated “fairly low,” and by 53% of the 
138 rated “average.” Of the 150 Republicans placed into Figure 2’s average or below 
category, the tax cut was supported by 50% of the 2 rated “very low,” by 94% of the 18 
rated “fairly low,” and by 89% of the 130 rated “average.” 
 
7 Twenty-six respondents identified themselves as neither liberal nor conservative and 
answered the tax cut question. Of these respondents, twelve were rated “very low” to 
“average” and seven (58%) of them supported the cut; eight were rated “fairly high” and 
five of them (55%) supported the cut; and eight were rated very high with three (60%) 
supporting the cut. Fifty respondents identified themselves as neither Democrat nor 
Republican and answered the tax cut question. Of these respondents, twenty-seven were 
rated “very low” to “average” and 63% of them supported the cut; eleven were rated 
“fairly high” and 73% of them supported the cut; and twelve were rated very high with 
(50%) supporting the cut. In neither case is the relationship between information and tax 
cut support equivalent to the one described by Bartels. 
 
8 NES interviewers rated almost all respondents as having an average or above average 
level of political information. This fact presents an additional problem for Bartels’ thesis 
-- for if we treat the interviewer assessments as a valid measure of a respondents’ 
political information, then we must conclude that almost all of the support for the tax cut 
was offered by respondents rated average or above average in their political information. 
The “simple ignorance” thesis is not consistent with this fact. 
 
9 Like Bartels, we coded responses as 1 for those who strongly support the tax cut, .5 for 
those who support it, -.5 for those who opposed it, -1 for those who strongly opposed it, 
and as 0 for all others. Political information equals 0 for respondents who receive the 
lowest information rating from NES interviewers, 1 for those who receive the highest 
rating, and interim values of (.75, .5, .25) for those whose ratings are in the middle of the 
interviewers’ 5-point scale. With the exception of running separate regressions for 
different partisans or ideologues, we use the same instrumental variables equation as 
Bartels. This includes using the post-election interviewer rating as an instrument for the 
pre-election rating (the two are correlated at .35). We also use the same NES sample 
weights in our regressions. For readers who are interested in our variable codings and 
regression equations, we have available a complete replication file. 
 
10 While only Republicans and Democrats are explicitly referred to in the regression in 
question, elsewhere in “Homer,” results are characterized for liberals and conservatives. 
Since the two means of classifying respondents are not identical, we report results on 
both groupings in Table 1 to demonstrate the robustness of our claim. We also ran 
regressions for respondents who categorized themselves as Bush supporters and 
opponents (the variable the Bartels uses as an instrument for Republican Party 
identification in the replicated regression). In neither of these cases did the political 
information coefficient achieve statistical significance. 
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11 Moreover, the 2002 NES later asked respondents “How important is this issue to you 
personally - very important, somewhat, or not important at all? Almost 30 percent of 
respondents replied “very important” and another 57 percent replied “somewhat 
important.” Differences between Republicans and Democrats were neither large nor 
significant, with Republicans only slightly more likely to say that the issue was somewhat 
or very important. With respect to the question of whether Republican support for the tax 
cut was due to ignorance or something else, two statistics are worth noting. First, the 
more important Republicans rated the tax cut issue, the more likely they were to support 
it. Second, sixty-five respondents identified themselves as Republican, responded that the 
tax cut issue was either “very important” or “somewhat important,” and received the 
highest possible information rating. Sixty-two of them (over 95%) supported the tax cut. 
 
12 http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2001/06/07_mpp.html. Indeed, looking back 
at the web pages posted on economics and the tax cut reveals many strong claims about 
what economics had to say about the likely consequences of the tax cut. While many of 
these pages viewed in isolation suggested a consensus among economists, reading across 
pages revealed deep and important disagreements. Among the topics about which leading 
economists disagreed were about the extent to which the tax cuts were of sufficient size 
to generate a short-term economic stimulus and whether the nature of their targeting 
made such a stimulus more or less likely. Others argued that the tax cut's relatively large 
benefits to the rich would be more effective in boosting longer term growth by increasing 
the demand for investment rather than consumption, though these arguments were often 
countered by fears of increasing the deficit. More noteworthy is that advocates on both 
sides of the tax cut issue could, in the early months of 2001, find leading economists that 
would support their point of view. While we suspect that this information will tempt 
some to conclude that the economists on the “other side” of the tax cut issue were just 
ignorant, it is important to remember that economics is a complicated field of study. 
There is no universally recognized axiom sufficient to render the Bush tax cut right or 
wrong. Therefore, notions such as “simple ignorance” are not an accurate or constructive 
way to characterize the views of those economists with whom one disagrees. 
  
13 The questions were as follows. Iraq: As you may know, President Bush and his top 
advisers are discussing the possibility of taking military action against Iraq to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE military action against Iraq -- 
or is this something you haven't thought about? Corporate scandal: Over the last year, 
investigations into a number of large corporations such as Enron have found top 
executives to have exaggerated profits through shady accounting procedures.  The 
executives received huge bonuses, but their companies went bankrupt and workers lost 
their jobs and retirement savings. How much attention would you say you've paid to 
those stories -- QUITE A LOT, SOME, JUST A LITTLE, or NONE AT ALL? Political 
campaigns: Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about 
you? Would you say that you have been VERY MUCH INTERESTED, SOMEWHAT 
INTERESTED or NOT MUCH INTERESTED in the political campaigns so far this 
year? For this question, we coded people as not thinking about the issue if they said they 
were “not much interested.” 
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14 Bartels notes that in his analysis of a related issue – the repeal of the inheritance tax -- 
even highly informed people were split on the issue (Krupnikov et.al. (2006) reveal that 
88 % of highly informed Republicans and nearly 60% of highly informed Democrats 
supported estate tax repeal). He argues (2005:25) that many respondents lacked a moral 
basis “for thinking of growing economic inequality as a problem that might be 
exacerbated by repealing the inheritance tax.” However, it is worth noting that like the 
tax cut, the inheritance tax had broad support among political elites -- a fact that parallels 
Bartels’ own findings about the opinions of the most highly informed respondents in his 
study. He concludes that “these results…highlight real and profound limits of political 
information as a transforming force when it comes to public opinion about complex 
policy issues.” If we read this claim correctly, it implies that even when people are well 
informed they still do not meet his preferred standard of decision making.   
15 While readers are likely accustomed to arguments of the form that poor or middle class 
people who support Republicans are necessarily voting contrary to their true self-interest, 
they may be less accustomed to seeing a parallel argument applied to traditional 
Democratic voters. We offer an example of such an argument, itself presented as irony, to 
reinforce the idea that citizens can reach political conclusions for reasons that are not 
strictly economic. 
“The thirty-seven blocks of residential towers that line the western edge of 
Central Park, from its lower end at Columbus Circle to the age-old social barrier 
of Ninety-sixth Street, make up a self-contained world whose sprawling 
apartments, with their high-ceilinged living rooms, formal dining rooms, and 
unobtrusive maids' quarters, are home to investment bankers, corporate lawyers, 
and media executives. And yet in a baffling testament to the failure of Americans 
to grasp their economic self-interest, the residents of CPW (as locals colloquially 
call their street) overwhelmingly voted for John Kerry and the Democrats. This 
shouldn’t be!…Why, then, does Central Park West cling so stubbornly to 
irrational Democratic Party loyalties? The most plausible explanation is that the 
prickly voters of CPW feel that their traditional moral values (getting into Yale on 
merit, reading books other than the Bible, cherishing things from France) are not 
fully embraced by President Bush…CPW is an insular and hidebound 
neighborhood, brimming with cultural resentments unfathomable to outlanders.”  
(Shapiro 2005) 
16 The “simple ignorance” conclusion on which we focus our reanalysis is the final step 
in a more extended statistical argument about why people supported the tax cut. Bartels 
first shows that many people respond to a survey question about growing economic 
inequality by saying that it is a bad thing. He then contrasts these responses with their 
support for the tax cut and seeks an explanation. In addition, he contends most people 
should have opposed the tax cut because it was against their “material self interest” while 
admitting that the basis of his calculation of such interest is “obviously debatable.” He 
devotes the final statistical analysis to questions of why so many people supported the tax 
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cuts nevertheless. To this end, Bartels analyzed how respondent opinions of their relative 
tax burdens related to their feelings about the tax cut. He found that people who 
perceived their own tax burdens as being too high were particularly likely to support the 
tax cut: 
 
 “[R]espondents’ subjective perceptions of their own tax burdens had a consistent 
and very substantial effect on their views about the 2001 tax cuts…[T]his effect 
of “unenlightened self-interest” is extremely consequential for the aggregate 
distribution of policy preferences accounting for more than three-fourths of the 
substantial net support for the 2001 tax cut in the NES sample…” (Bartels 
2005:23) 
After reaching this conclusion, Bartels (2005:23) asks, “One is left to wonder how these 
people would resolve the contradictions implied by their simultaneous antipathies toward 
inequality and taxation—if they recognized those contradictions.” This question leads to 
his final statistical analysis which yields the “simple ignorance” conclusion.  
 
Having focused on the validity of the “ignorance” claim in the text, we offer three 
comments about Bartels’ prior conclusion that his findings demonstrate “unenlightened 
self interest.” we have three comments – each of which parallels an argument that already 
appears in our text. First, the conclusion is premature. As we have argued above, people 
can support or oppose a tax policy for many reasons. The fact that middle and low 
income people voiced support for the policy does not, as Bartels suggests, make them 
inferior thinkers nor (given continuing debates amongst economists about the impact of 
changes to the tax code) does it necessarily make them worse off. Second, the conclusion 
is speculative. The 2002 NES did not ask respondents to give an opinion about how the 
Bush tax cuts would affect their relative tax burden (or their well being) – it asked about 
their perceived tax burden as a general matter. While we could speculate as to what such 
responses might be, the data provide no direct evidence of how people relate the Bush tax 
cut to their own perceived tax burden. Third, the statistical result is not the same for 
conservatives and Republicans as it is for liberals and Democrats. We come to this 
conclusion by rerunning the regression described in the long quote above. Our re-analysis 
follows the same rules as in Table 1: replicate Bartels’s procedures as closely as possible 
and then run different regressions by party or ideology. The regressions contain the same 
dependent variable as in Table 1 and the same control variables accounting for party 
identification, family income, and the question wording experiment. Unlike Table 1, 
political information is not included, but several other independent variables appear. 
Bartels adds a conservative ideology measure along with responses to three questions 
about tax burdens. These questions ask about the respondent’s own tax burden, the tax 
burden of “the rich,” and the tax burden of “the poor” respectively. The lowest values (-
1) of these variables indicate that the named entity pays “less than they should” while the 
highest values (+1) indicate that, in the respondent’s opinion, the named entity pays more 
than it should. Roughly half of ANES respondents (including 41% of Democrats and 
54% of Republicans) believed that they pay more than they should. Bartels’ regression 
(column 4 of his Table 3) again restricts all respondents to react to changing perceptions 
of their own tax burdens in an identical manner. The coefficient on “own tax burden” is 
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.575 and statistically significant (s.e.=.112). In our analysis, the same coefficient for 
regressions on Democrats and liberals are .892 (s.e.=.205) and 1.128 (s.e.=.313). When 
liberals and Democrats come to feel that they pay too much, they are significantly less 
likely to support the tax cut. The effect is much smaller, and not significant, for 
conservatives and Republicans. For Republicans the coefficient is .479 (s.e.=.364) and for 
conservatives it is .168 (s.e.=.199). So even if we put our first two objections to the side, 
Bartels’ claim about the relationship between unenlightened self interest, perceived tax 
burden, and support for the tax cut would apply primarily to liberals and Democrats to the 
extent that it applies at all. A full description of this work is available upon request.  
 
17 Finally, Bartels (2005:23 emphasis added) concludes from his analysis of tax burdens 
and enlightened self-interest “that liberals and Democrats were much less susceptible 
than conservatives and Republicans were to the simple allure of lower taxes.” This 
conclusion that such people supported the tax cut because of the “simple allure” is 
speculative, at best. Because nearly all Republicans and conservatives supported the tax 
cut and the fact that the 2002 NES does not include any questions about why people felt 
as they did about the tax cut, there is not sufficient variance in the dependent variable nor 
sufficient information in the available independent variables for Bartels (or us) to identify 
a single cause for why Republicans and conservatives supported the 2001 tax cut. 
 
18 Krupnikov et. al. (2006), employ our reasoning and other methods to demonstrate the 
limited power of parallel arguments about the role of public ignorance in explaining for 
repeal of the estate tax. In one analysis, the same ANES data referenced in this article 
yields the finding that higher information levels correspond to a significant increase in 
support for estate tax repeal amongst Republicans.  
 
20 The act of judging “out group” members “ignorant” because they cannot answer 
questions that the evaluator has deemed essential is a common fallacy in scholarship on 
civic competence.  The fallacy occurs when an evaluator mistakes his peer group’s 
consensus on the importance of a particular set of claims for a set of conditions that are 
necessary for other people to accomplish their tasks. While the history of intelligence 
testing in the 19th and 20th century is replete with such errors, the fallacy is avoidable. 
Avoidance requires a more careful analysis of the relationship between particular pieces 
of information and a person’s ability to accomplish a well-defined set of tasks. For more, 
see Lupia (2005, 2006). 
 
21 For more on this point and related opinion dynamics see Brady and Sniderman (1985) 
and Chubb, Hagen, and Sniderman (1991). 
